Prosecutor\u27s Duty to Disclose Evidence by Kassabian, Brett A.
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 15
Number 1 Volume 15, Number 1 Article 8
10-1-1984
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Evidence
Brett A. Kassabian
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kassabian, Brett A. (1984) "Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Evidence," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 15 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss1/8
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Evidence
I. INTRODUCTION
A prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory, material
evidence to a defense attorney, even absent a request.' This duty hinges
on the materiality of the suppressed evidence. If the suppressed evidence
is determined to be material to the defendant's guilt or innocence, then
the prosecutor has breached his duty to disclose. Thus, the particular
test of materiality, applied by a judge in a post-conviction proceeding,
determines the scope of a prosecutor's duty to disclose.
In State v. McDowell,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court articulated,
for the first time, the proper standard of materiality that gives rise to a
prosecutor's duty to volunteer favorable evidence to a defense attorney.
McDowell holds that where the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence,
which is likely to create a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to the
defendant's guilt, a new trial is required.3 The McDowell court implicitly
rejects the pro-prosecution standard of materiality4 proffered in United
States v. Agurs,5 which requires reversal only where there is a "strong
likelihood that the undisclosed favorable evidence would have affected
the verdict."6 Consequently, in North Carolina, a defense attorney has a
pro-defense standard of materiality to meet in establishing that the prose-
cutor's failure to volunteer favorable evidence denied the defendant a fair
trial. The pro-defense standard only requires a "reasonable chance that a
jury hearing it would decide the case differently." 7
The purpose of this note is threefold. First, this note will trace the
development of the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence to the defense
1. For a discussion of the prosecutor's duty to volunteer favorable evidence, see infra notes 46-
68 and accompanying text.
2. 310 N.C. 61, 310 S.E.2d 301 (1984).
3. Id.
4. For the purposes of this note, pro-prosecution standard of materiality will refer to a stan-
dard that is less likely to result in reversals of convictions for failure to disclose. A pro-defense
standard of materiality will refer to a standard that is more likely to result in reversals of convictions
for failure to disclose. For an explanation of these terms, see Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1148 n.52
(1982). Finally, "test of materiality" and "standard of materiality" will be used interchangeably.
5. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
6. Babcock, supra note 4, at 1148 ( Pro-prosecution standard places the burden on the defend-
ant to show the strong "likelihood that the verdict would have been affected") (citing Agurs, 427
U.S. at 104).
7. Id. at 1147 (citing United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S.
97 (1976)).
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DUTY TO DISCLOSE
attorney. Second, this note will examine the McDowell court's deviation
from established tests of materiality regarding the prosecutor's duty to
volunteer evidence. Finally, this note will postulate the effects of a pro-
defense test of materiality.
II. THE CASE
A jury convicted Robert Henry McDowell for the first degree murder
of Carol Ann Hinson and the felonious assault of Patsy Ann Mason.8
McDowell was sentenced to death and to twenty years, respectively. 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and
sentence. 1o
Subsequently, McDowell filed a motion for a new trial based, in part,
on a denial of due process because of the prosecutor's failure to disclose
material, exculpatory evidence. 1 The suppressed evidence consisted pri-
marily of the following: Patsy Mason had originally reported to the po-
lice that her assailant was white. McDowell is black.12 The superior
court concluded that the prosecutor's failure to volunteer the evidence
"raise[s] sufficient constitutional and due processs questions [and there is
a] substantial likelihood of a federal court requiring a new trial at some
distant future date . ,13 The court awarded McDowell a new trial.14
The state appealed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
what standard of materiality trial judges should apply in post-conviction
proceedings when assessing the effect of the prosecutor's nondisclosure of
8. McDowell, was tried, convicted, and sentenced in the Criminal Session of the Superior
Court of Johnston County, the Honorable Donald Smith, Superior Court Judge presiding. The state
introduced evidence to show that McDowell entered the bedroom shared by Carol Hinson and Patsy
Mason. The victims were four and fourteen years old respectively. McDowell allegedly struck each
girl repeatedly with a two-foot long machete. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. McDowell, 301 N.C.
279, 282, 271 S.E.2d 286, 289 (1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1025, reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 1012 (1981).
9. McDowell, 301 N.C. at 284, 271 S.E.2d at 290.
10. Id. at 293-94, 271 S.E.2d at 295-96. McDowell was granted a motion for stay of execution
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 63, 310 S.E.2d 301, 303
(1984).
11. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 63, 310 S.E.2d at 303. McDowell filed his motion during the Crimi-
nal Special Session of Lee Superior Court, the Honorable Judge Collier presiding. Id. McDowell
filed his original motion on the grounds of newly discovered evidence pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-1415 (1978), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415 (Cum. Supp. 1981). McDowell, 310
N.C. at 63-64, 310 S.E.2d at 303-04. For a discussion distinguishing a statutory right to relief based
on newly discovered evidence from a common law right to relief because of the prosecutor's failure
to disclose evidence, see infira notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
12. Brief for Appellee at 11. Also, the state knew that Patsy Mason had met McDowell prior
to the crime but she had testified to the contrary. Id. at 18. Furthermore, the state knew of prior
white intruders in the Mason home prior to the date of the crime. Id. at 14. Finally, the state was
aware of an eleven-year-old witness at the scene, who reported seeing a black man on a bicycle
approach the Mason home on the night of the offense. Id. at 17.
13. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 63, 310 S.E.2d at 303.
14. Id. at 65, 310 S.E.2d at 304.
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unrequested exculpatory evidence at trial."5 The court held that the
proper test of materiality is whether the suppressed evidence is likely to
create a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to the defendant's guilt. 6
The court vacated the lower court's order and remanded the case to the
superior court for a hearing de novo. 17
III. BACKGROUND
In examining the impact of State v. McDowell, it is necessary to discuss
the common law development of the prosecutor's duty to disclose. The
case law can be categorized into three situations. Each area involves the
post-trial discovery of evidence known to the prosecutor but unknown to
the defense attorney. The first concerns the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony. The second involves the prosecutor's failure to dis-
close evidence after the defense attorney has made a specific request. The
third regards the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence absent a spe-
cific request.
A. The First Situation: Prosecutor's Knowing Use of Perjury
The origin of the prosecutor's duty to disclose derived from cases in-
volving the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony.18 The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the prosecutor's
knowing use of perjury,' 9 or failure to correct testimony known to be
false,' 0 denied the defendant a fair trial. Thus, where the prosecutor sup-
15. Id. at 69, 310 S.E.2d at 306.
16. Id. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 309.
17. Id. at 75, 310 S.E.2d at 310.
18. Common to these cases is the early courts' focus on willful prosecutorial misconduct as
opposed to the detrimental effect of the perjured testimony on the defendant. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at
104 n.10; see generally Comment, Brady v. Maryland and The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 112 (1972) (discussion of the development of the courts' justifications for appropriate
standards of materiality).
19. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (prosecutor's knowing use of perjury to
obtain a conviction denied defendant due process); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (affirming
Mooney standard); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (in rape conviction, prosecutor's deliberate
misrepresentation that defendant's shorts had victim's blood stains on them when he knew they only
had paint stains denied defendant due process).
20. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1951) (where defendant asserted fit of passion at trial
for murder of his wife, prosecutor's failure to correct state witness' testimony, known to be false,
denied defendant due process); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (extended Alcorta in
holding prosecutor's failure to correct perjury going to credibility of state witness denied defendant
fair trial); see also People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885,
887 (1956).
[I]t is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness' credibility rather than di-
rectly upon a defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and if it is in any way
relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he
knows to be false and elicit the truth.
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presses evidence indicating that he knew or should have known of the use
of perjured testimony, a new trial may be ordered.
The Court has applied a pro-defense standard of materiality in deter-
mining whether a new trial is warranted. That standard is whether the
false testimony is likely to have affected the judgment of thejury.21 Early
decisions have justified the pro-defense test by focusing on intentional
prosecutorial misconduct.22 Subsequent cases have focused upon the
corruption of the integrity of the judicial process23 as well as the detri-
mental effect upon the defendant.24
Therefore under the pro-defense standard, in those cases where the
prosecutor fails to make a disclosure of the false statement, the defense
attorney has a lesser burden to meet to receive a new trial. First, the
defense attorney must establish the use of perjury. Second, the defense
attorney must prove that the prosecutor knew25 or should have known of
the perjury.26 Finally, the false evidence must be likely to have affected
the judgment of the jury. If all three are established, the defendant is
entitled to a new trial.
B. The Second Situation: Failure to Disclose After a Specific Request
and the Origin of a Third Situation
The Brady v. Maryland27 decision and its progeny mark a clear devia-
tion in the development of the prosecutor's duty to disclose. In Brady,
the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of whether a prosecutor
21. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972) (announcing a similar standard: "if the false testimony could. . . in any reasonable
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.").
22. For a discussion of the early justifications for a pro-defense standard, see Agurs, 427 U.S. at
104 n.10.
23. Id. at 104.
24. For a discussion of the subsequent justifications for a pro-defense standard, see Comment,
supra note 18, at 135.
25. For a discussion of fact situations which fall within the confines of the prosecutor's knowing
of the use of perjury, see Comment, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose: From Brady to Agurs and
Beyond, 69 J. Crim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 204 (1978).
26. The phrase, "should have known of the perjury" refers to those cases where a prosecutor is
imputed to know of a perjury where another member of the prosecutor's staff has knowledge of it.
See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150 (imputed knowledge of the other prosecutor); United States v. McCord,
509 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prosecution is comprised of all those agencies involved in prosecution
of criminals); Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (imputed knowl-
edge of police). The term "should have known" has not been held to refer to the prosecutor's knowl-
edge of prior inconsistent statements. See United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal.
1976), afld, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's knowledge of prior inconsistent statement
did not constitute the knowing use of perjury); Wilson v. State, 372 A.2d 198 (Del. 1977) (prosecu-
tor's knowledge of an exculpatory statement contradicting witness did not constitute the knowing
use of perjury); accord McDonald v. State, 553 P.2d 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). But see Note,
The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After United States v. Agurs, 1977 ILL. L.F. 690, 996 (proposition
that a prosecutor knowingly uses false evidence where he allows a witness to testify despite the fact
that prosecutor possesses evidence of witness' prior inconsistent statements).
27. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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has a duty to disclose evidence and determined that such a duty did exist.
However, in subsequent cases, the Court struggled with the inadequacies
of the Brady decision-namely, whether a specific request is a condition
precedent to the application of the duty and what is the appropriate stan-
dard of materiality. Finally, the decision of United States v. Agurs28 and
its progeny attempted to resolve the unanswered questions in Brady. The
Agurs Court articulated a third situation that consists of a failure to dis-
close absent a specific request.29 These cases mark the transition of the
duty to disclose from an inference to an articulable standard.
1. The Brady Rule
In Brady v. Maryland,0 the Supreme Court altered the Mooney stan-
dard 31 to encompass a prosecutor's duty to disclose material, favorable
evidence, which had been specifically requested by the defense attorney.32
The Brady Court justified the duty by placing emphasis upon a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial as well as the proper administration of justice.33
Thus, the Court announced that an affirmative duty to disclose evidence,
material to the defendant's guilt or innocence, exists where the defense
attorney has made a specific request for the information.
However, the Brady Court failed to consider certain practical
problems in applying this rule. Brady neglected to articulate whether a
specific request was a condition precedent to the application of the rule.34
28. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
29. Id.
30. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the defendant was charged with first degree murder.
Although he admitted participation in the murder, defendant claimed that Boblit had done the ac-
tual killing. Prior to the trial, the defense attorney made a specific request to the prosecution for all
of Boblit's extra-judicial statements. The prosecutor withheld Boblit's admission that he had com-
mitted the offense. Subsequent to defendant's conviction, the defense attorney filed a motion for a
new trial. Id. at 84-87.
31. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
32. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court stated: "[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id.
33. Id. The Court noted: "[S]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly." Id. The Court's imposition of the duty, "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution," impliedly rejects prosecutor misconduct as a justification. Brady was not the first
departure from the Mooney rationale. See United States ex reL Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955) (focusing on effect of prosecutor's acts upon the defense
rather than prosecutorial malfeasance in holding that prosecutor's failure to disclose favorable evi-
dence denied defendant due process); United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563
(2d Cir. 1961) (emphasis on effect of prosecutor's negligent suppression of evidence at defendant's
trial).
34. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (expansive reading
of Brady, stating: "I see no reason to make the result turn on the adventitious circumstance of a
request."); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (request requir-
ment satisfied by a general pretrial request). But see id. at 794-95 (retreatist reading requiring a
special request for favorable, material evidence). Some early courts of appeals held that a specific
5
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Furthermore, that Court never articulated a standard of materiality by
which the effect of the undisclosed evidence3" could be assessed.36 Thus,
the Brady opinion provided few guidelines for subsequent decisions ap-
plying the Brady test.
2. Agurs' Resolution of Brady's Inadequacies
In Agurs, the Supreme Court confronted and resolved the unanswered
questions of Brady. Agurs proffered that the Brady rule applies in three
situations: prosecutors's use of perjury, failure to disclose after a specific
request, and failure to disclose absent a specific request.37 Furthermore,
Agurs articulated the precise standard of materiality applicable in the
specific request situation. That standard is the pro-defense standard of
whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the
trial.38 The Court justified this lesser standard on the grounds that a
specific request puts the prosecutor on notice, and failure to disclose may
lead the defendant to believe the evidence is nonexistent.39
However, there are several requirements which a defense attorney
must meet in order to establish that the prosecutor's failure to disclose
evidence requested by the defendant warrants a new trial.4 First, Agurs
requires that the defense attorney make a specific pre-trial request for the
request is not a condition precedent to the application of the Brady rule. See Barbee v. Warden, Md.
Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir. 1964); Meers v. Wilkins, 336 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964) (same
grounds).
35. The Supreme Court has generally held that nondisclosure of impeaching evidence may war-
rant a new trial. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("when the reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting
credibility falls within this general rule") (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions have also recognized no distinction. See Ingram v. Pey-
ton, 367 F.2d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1966) (unintentional withholding of prior convictions of key
witness required reversal); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976) (nondisclosure of police
promise of leniency to key witness required reversal). For a similar discussion in non-request cases,
see infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
36. Various tests of materiality have been applied. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55 (applying the
Napue standard: a reasonable likelihood of the evidence affecting the outcome of the trial); cf Giles,
386 U.S. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (applying the Mooney test: suppressed evidence having an
outcome on the trial). But see id. at 101-02 (Fortas, J., concurring) (suppressed evidence helpful to
the jury); cf Moore, 408 U.S. at 809 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (evidence helpful to the defense).
37. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). "[Brady] arguably applies in three quite
different situations. Each involves the discovery after trial of information which had been known to
the prosecutor but unknown to the defense." Id.
38. Id. at 104. "A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the require-
ment of materiality is the concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of
the trial." Id.
39. Id. at 106. See United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1978) (unless a request is
precise enough to give the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defendant seeks, it will be treated as
no request or a general request). But see United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1975)
(request for all exculpatory and impeaching material is specific).
40. The Agurs Court reasoned that where a defendant makes a general request, the duty to
disclose arises from the exculpatory evidence as opposed to the request. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106. But
some cases hold that if the evidence is so obviously important to the defense, the prosecution would
6
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information.4 Numerous lower courts have struggled with whether a
vague pre-trial request should be considered a specific one under the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the pro-defense standard of materiality.4' Sec-
ond, the nondisclosed evidence must be favorable.43  Third, the
nondisclosed evidence must be material. 4 Fourth, some courts have re-
quired that the suppressed evidence be admissible.45  Finally, some
courts have required that the defense attorney make a showing of due
diligence.46 Where a defense attorney can meet these requirements it can
usually be shown that the undisclosed evidence would have likely af-
fected the verdict and a new trial will be granted.
certainly have been on notice; suppression should be treated as a specific request. United States v.
Morrel, 524 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1972).
41. A specific request must be precise enough "to give the prosecution notice of exactly what
the defendant seeks." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.
42. For lower court decisions interpreting requests as too vague to be treated as specific, see
Ostrer v. United States, 577 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.) (request for material in possession of the government
bearing on credibility of state witness not specific), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1978); United States
v. Laskey, 548 F.2d 835, 839 n.2 (9th Cir.) (request for "all information regarding police re-
ports, . . . promises or communications with government witnesses not specific"), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 821 (1977); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 507, 509, 284 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1983) (prosecutor was
justified in treating a request for a complete accounting of all police investigatory work in the case as
not specific). These holdings were justified on the ground that the requests were so vague as to place
the prosecutor in no better position of discerning what the defense wanted as no request at all. But
see Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 220 (4th Cir. 1980) (request for "psychiatric or other
reports which might tend to reflect on the credibility or competency of any. . . prospective wit-
nesses. . ." held specific); McCrane, 547 F.2d at 207 (request for impeaching evidence of state
witness was specific).
43. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 298 S.E.2d 631 (1983) (evidence must be favorable
to defendant); Duncan v. State, 103 Ga. App. 148, 294 S.E.2d 365 (1982) (duty to disclose only
exculpatory evidence); Ruiz v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 230, 249 N.W.2d 277 (1977) (no duty to disclose
unless evidence is probative of guilt or innocence).
44. Alston, 307 N.C. at 337, 298 S.E.2d at 642 (defendant failed to show that the suppressed
evidence was material and what effect, if any, the nondisclosure would have had on outcome of the
trial); see also Duncan, 103 Ga. App. at 148, 294 S.E.2d at 367 ("of course [defendant] had not seen
the statement. . . but the burden was nevertheless to show how the statement was expected to be
material to his defense .... "); see also State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 127, 235 S.E.2d 828, 842
(1977) (where defense attorney makes a request for evidence and neither he nor the prosecutor can
definitely say it is material, judge should order an in camera inspection of the requested
information).
45. See Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977) (disclosure of informant's iden-
tity is inadmissible and thus immaterial); accord United States v. Atkinson, 429 F. Supp. 880
(E.D.N.C. 1977). But see State v. Peterson, 219 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1974) (rejected admissibility
requirement); United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (duty to disclose inadmissible
evidence which may lead to admissible, favorable evidence).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir. 1980) ("regardless of whether
a request was specific or general, and regardless of whether the evidence was material or even excul-
patory, when information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial, and his only reason for
not obtaining. . . the evidence. . . is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady
claim"); United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant did not exercise due
diligence in obtaining information the prosecutor had obtained).
7
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C. The Third Situation: Failure to Disclose Absent a Specific Request
Case law regarding a prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence, absent a
specific request, has been developed by lower courts' application of the
rules set forth in Agurs. This is the third situation articulated by Agurs.
The landmark Supreme Court decision of United States v. Agurs, recog-
nized that an affirmative duty to disclose exists in some situations, and
addressed the proper tests of materiality that give rise to that duty.47
1. The Agurs Rule
In Agurs, the Court attempted to dispel the confusion among lower
courts regarding the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable, material evi-
dence to the defense attorney, even absent a specific request for the infor-
mation.48 Agurs recognized 49 that a prosecutor has a constitutional duty
to disclose based on the defendant's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the
due process clause.50 Thus, the language of the United States Constitu-
tion, as opposed to the statutory authority of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, mandates a duty to disclose.5 1
By indirection, Agurs established a pro-prosecution standard of materi-
ality to be applied in cases in which there has been no specific request.
The opinion proffers the proper standard by expressly rejecting alterna-
tive standards. The first standard rejected is the rule 33 motion under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring a new trial if the evi-
dence probably would have resulted in an acquittal.52 The Court noted
that the rule 33 test was unduly harsh under circumstances where there
has been no request.5 3 The second standard rejected was the "harmless
error" test requiring a new trial unless the judge is sure that the error did
not have an effect on the jury.54 The Court concluded that the "harmless
error" standard was too lenient and would result in automatic rever-
47. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
48. Agurs was charged with the murder of Sewell but claimed self-defense. Subsequent to her
conviction, Agurs made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the prosecutor failed to volun-
teer evidence of Sewell's past criminal record that would have supported her self-defense theory. Id.
at 99-100.
49. Id. at 107.
50. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
51. Id. Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for a retrial based on
newly discovered evidence. Federal courts have held that the essential requisites for a new trial are:
(i) newly discovered evidence, (ii) defense attorney must exercise due diligence, (iii) evidence is mate-
rial to the issues, (iv) evidence is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal in the
event of retrial. See United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1975).
52. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109; see generally United States v. Thompson, 493 F.2d 305, 310 (9th
Cir. 1974) (defining burden for establishing grounds for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence), cert denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1975).
53. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. Furthermore, the Court distinguished between the typical rule 33
action where the newly discovered evidence derives from a neutral source and the present action
where the evidence is in the hands of the prosecutor. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 112. See generally Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
8
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sals.5 After focusing on the criminal law standard of finding guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, 56 the Court stated:
This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the
entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not
the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new
trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity,
additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt.5 7
Thus, where the prosecutor fails to volunteer favorable, exculpatory evi-
dence to a defense attorney, a new trial is required if that evidence would
have created a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt.
In a blistering dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
argued that a pro-defense standard of materiality should apply. 8 Essen-
tially, the standard applied by the majority was whether the suppressed
evidence was likely to create a reasonable doubt as to guilt in the minds
of the jurors who convicted the defendant. The dissent offered several
reasons for rejecting the reasonable doubt test.5 9 First, the dissent noted
that there is no significant difference between the reasonable doubt test
and the rule 33 test rejected by the majority.' Second, the dissent ar-
gued that a pro-prosecution standard is inconsistent with the concept
that evidence showing innocence should be brought to the jury's atten-
tion.61 Third, the reasonable doubt test abrogates the jury's traditional
function as the trier of fact, by allowing the judge to assess the material-
ity in his own mind.62 Thus, the dissent advocated a pro-defense test of
55. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-14. The Court reasoned that since the prosecution need not open all
its files to the defendant, every nondisclosure should not be treated as error. See generally Moore v.
Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 798 (1972); In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 556, 287 P.2d 6, 14, 35 Cal. Rptr.
293, 301 (1963) (prosecutor is under no duty to report sua sponte to the defense attorney all that he
learns about the case and about his witnesses).
56. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
57. Id. at 112-13. The Court, in evaluating the nondisclosed evidence in the context of the
entire record, held that Agurs had not been denied due process since one could remain convinced of
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
58. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the proper test of materiality
in non-request cases for disclosure should be "[whether] there is a significant chance that the with-
held evidence, developed by skilled counsel, would have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of
enough jurors to avoid a conviction." Id. at 121-22. See generally United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1969) (conviction reversed in absence of request for disclosure since significant chance
existed that new evidence could have induced reasonable doubt); United States ex rel Fein v.
Deegon, 410 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1969) (same grounds); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
1968) (applying a similar standard and recognizing the necessity to balance interests between the
defendant, the prosecutor, and the judicial system).
59. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 116. ("[S]urely if a judge is able to say that evidence actually creates a reasonable
doubt as to guilt in his mind (the court's standard) he would also conclude that the evidence 'proba-
bly would have resulted in an aequittal' (the rule 33 standard).").
61. Id. at 117.
62. Id. at 118.
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materiality that would allow the evidence to be assessed in terms of how
it would have affected the jury.
2. The Application of Agurs
The lower courts generally have been deferential to the "reasonable
doubt" test of materiality implicit in Agurs. The courts of appeals gener-
ally have held that the materiality of the nondisclosed evidence is as-
sessed by the "reasonable doubt" test.63 On the other hand, some courts
of appeals have held that the reasonable doubt should be raised in the
jury's, as opposed to the judge's, mind." Several circuits have recog-
nized a harsher test of materiality regarding the nondisclosure of im-
peachment evidence.6" However, the majority rule recognizes no
distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence."
Furthermore, state courts consistently have applied a variation of the
63. See, ag., United States v. Martorano, 663 F.2d 1113, 1115 (1st Cir. 1981) (evaluation of
record in its entirety did not create a reasonable doubt); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181,
1204 (5th Cir. 1981) (failure to disclose impeaching evidence not sufficient "to create a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist"); Briggs v. Raines, 652 F.2d 862, 863 (9th Cir. 1981) (where
defendant makes a general request, or no request, the evidence is not material within the meaning of
Brady "unless it [is] sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt"); United States v
Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) (recognizing Brady applied in three different situa-
tions); Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 222 (4th Cir. 1980) (test of materiality is "whether
suppressed evidence [is] of sufficient probative value to create a reasonable doubt of guilt. . . where
none theretofore existed."); United States v. Ramerez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecu-
tor's failure to disclose witness' statement that he had not been threatened, where witness testified
that he had been threatened, did not create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt); United States v.
Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 1978) (government's failure to disclose that key witness admit-
ted to testifying falsely did not create a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist).
64. See, eg., Cannon v. Alabama, 558 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1977) (materiality of sup-
pressed evidence should be weighed in the jury's mind), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978); accord
United States v. Librach, 609 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980); but see
Ostrer v. United States, 577 F.2d 782, 788 (2d Cir. 1978) (judge is to determine whether the sup-
pressed evidence creates a reasonable doubt in his mind rather than the jury's mind), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979). For another case expounding the proposition that the judge weighs the mate-
riality of the evidence in his own mind, see supra note 60.
65. See, e-g., Talamonte v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 877
(1981); United States v. Imbruglia, 617 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1980) ("courts have expressed some
uncertainty about granting new trials when the Agurs 'reasonable doubt' standard applies and the
materiality of the newly discovered evidence rests upon its impeaching character"); United States v.
Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 656 (9th Cir. 1977) (lesser duty of prosecutor to disclose impeachment evi-
dence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818 (1978); Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
applied the rule 33 standard where prosecution failed to disclose prior inconsistent statement), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
66. See, ag., United States v. Laskey, 548 F.2d 835 (9th Cit. 1977) (failure to disclose prior
similar offenses of witness did not create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt); United States ex
reL Annunziato v. Manson, 425 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976) (prosecutor's failure to disclose
leniency agreements with witness showing bias could have created reasonable doubt), afid, 566 F.2d
410 (2d Cir. 1977). The Annunziato court stated that, while the evidence in Agurs was not impeach-
ment evidence, neither was it directly exculpatory evidence. Thus, the analysis utilized by the Court
in Agurs does not support the application of a different standard to Brady claims on the basis of the
character of the undisclosed evidence. Id. at 1280.
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"reasonable doubt" test.67
Thus, case law since Agurs has established multiple tests of materiality
to be used in assessing the effect of the prosecutor's suppression of evi-
dence. In summary, when a prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testi-
mony, a pro-defense test of materiality applies. When a prosecutor fails
to disclose favorable, material evidence after a specific request, a pro-
defense standard applies. Finally, when a prosecutor fails to volunteer
favorable, material evidence, absent a specific request, a pro-prosecution
standard applies. Once the duty-to-disclose category is identified, the ap-
propriate test of materiality can be applied.
IV. ANALYSIS
In State v. McDowell,65 the North Carolina Supreme Court articulated
a pro-defense test of materiality to be used by trial judges in assessing the
effect of material evidence which was undisclosed by the prosecutor and
unrequested by the defense attorney. The court held that due process
requires a new trial if the suppressed evidence likely would have created
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the jury's mind.69 MC-
Dowell recognized that this holding stemmed from the resolution of two
separate questions. The first question concerned the proper test of mate-
riality.70 The second question was whether the materiality was to be as-
sessed in the eyes of the judge or the jury.7 1 Although the McDowell
court repeatedly contended that its test of materiality was within the con-
fines of Agurs, the McDowell test unquestionably deviated from the test in
Agurs.
72
There are several unavoidable, but beneficial, consequences of the Mc-
Dowell holding. First, the court terminated the inherent inconsistency
perpetuated by the Agurs progeny in adopting the "likely to create a rea-
67. See, &g., Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 302 S.E.2d 555, 559 (1983) (state's failure to disclose
evidence impeaching credibility of witness testifying against defendant's co-conspirator not sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt); Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 494, 271 S.E.2d 792, 798 (1980)
(prosecutor's failure to disclose recent photo of suspect did not create a reasonable doubt); Payne v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 601, 607, 260 S.E.2d 247, 251 (1979) (failure to disclose prior inconsistent
statement to police not sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt); State v.
Hatfield, 286 S.E.2d 402, 411 (W. Va. 1982) (failure to disclose ownership of gun not sufficient to
create reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, where defendant asserts self-defense).
68. 310 N.C. 61, 310 S.E.2d 301 (1984).
69. Id. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 309.
70. Id. at 69, 310 S.E.2d at 307.
71. Id.
72. The McDowell court stated that its test of materiality was within the extremes noted in
Agurs. "Between the obviously opposite poles of no reasonable doubt, and verdicts 'already of ques-
tionable validity' lies a broad inevitably imprecise. . . area." McDowell, 310 N.C. at 70, 310 S.E.2d
at 307. Agurs has been interpreted as profferring a "reasonable doubt" test of materiality. Agurs,
427 U.S. at 112. McDowell proffered a "likely to create a reasonable doubt" test which is a pro-
defense test. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 309.
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sonable doubt" test.73 Second, the court restored the jury to its tradi-
tional role as fact finder by requiring that the reviewing court assess the
evidence through the eyes of the jury as opposed to accepting the trial
judge's determination.74 Third, McDowell effectively emasculated the
pro-prosecution standard in Agurs which resulted in a test of materiality
that weakened the defendant's interest in obtaining a full disclosure of all
relevant evidence."
A. Terminating the Inherent Inconsistency in Agurs
The Agurs "reasonable doubt" standard of materiality perpetuates an
inconsistency. The McDowell "likely to create a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard alleviates this inconsistency in reasoning.
1. The Inconsistency
Agurs established a standard of materiality by expressly rejecting alter-
native standards.76 The Supreme Court rejected the standard of materi-
ality for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence77 pursuant to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 33. The rule 33 standard pro-
vides that a new trial is required where the new evidence would probably
result in an acquittal.78 Agurs characterized the rule 33 standard as too
severe under the circumstances.79 The Court noted that a stronger pro-
prosecution standard would not give the prosecution the incentive to dis-
close exculpatory evidence since the likelihood of a reversal would be
slim.a° Instead, Agurs applied a "reasonable doubt" standard."'
The inconsistency in the Agurs rationale now becomes apparent be-
cause the "reasonable doubt" standard is as severe as the rule 33 stan-
dard. 2 From a functional analysis, to require that evidence create a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist is equivalent to requiring
73. Justice Marshall in his dissent recognized the flawed analysis. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. Cases arguing that the evidence should be assessed in the jury's eyes are discussed supra
note 64 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 63 (discussion of the weighing of these factors in formulating a test of mate-
riality in different situations).
76. 427 U.S. at 107-12 (rejecting "harmless error" and rule 33 standards of materiality).
77. Id. at. 107.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 111.
[Tihe fact that [in failure to disclose cases] such evidence was available to the prosecutor and
not submitted to the defense places it in a different category than if it had simply been discov-
ered from a neutral source after trial [in newly discovered evidence cases]. For that reason, the
defendant should not need to satisfy the severe burden of demonstrating that newly discovered
evidence probably would have resulted in an acquittal.
Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 114.
82. See id at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Surely if a judge is able to say that evidence
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the evidence to result in an acquittal. A defendant obtains an acquittal
by showing the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Thus, the
rationale underlying the "reasonable doubt" standard is flawed in that it
rejects a rule 33 standard as too harsh, but adopts a "reasonable doubt"
standard that is equally severe.
2. Removing the Inconsistency
The McDowell court read Agurs as representing the extremes of an
indefinite standard of materiality.8 3 The McDowell court stated that the
"likely to create a reasonable doubt" standard was a moderate standard
functionally equivalent to the "likely to have affected the outcome of the
trial" materiality standard.84
The "likely to have affected the outcome of the trial" standard is sub-
stantially less severe than the "probably would have resulted in an ac-
quittal" standard of rule 33. The phrase "affected the outcome of the
trial" encompasses a broader range of possibilities than "would have re-
sulted in an acquittal."8 The former includes the possibilities for a de-
fendant to obtain a hung jury, to be found guilty of a lesser included
offense, or to create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The latter includes
only the possibility for the defendant to create a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt.
Consequently, McDowell accomplished that which Agurs failed to do.
McDowell articulated a test of materiality that is not only less severe than
the rule 33 standard, but that also satisfies the reasoning of Agurs.86
B. Restoring Jury to Traditional Rule
The McDowell test of materiality, in allowing the evidence to be as-
sessed in the minds of the jury that convicted the defendant, properly
restored the jury to its traditional role as fact finder.87 First, McDowell
recognized the paramount concern, in any test of materiality, is the over-
all effect of the nondisclosed evidence on the outcome of the trial.8
Since the jury determines the outcome of the trial, the impact of the evi-
dence should be evaluated as it would affect the jury. Second, the use of
the jury as the forum through whose eyes the materiality is assessed is
consistent with the "likely to create a reasonable doubt" test of material-
actually creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt in his mind (the Court's standard), he would also
conclude that the evidence 'probably would result in an acquittal' (the rule 33 standard)." Id.
83. State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 69, 310 S.E.2d 301, 307 (1984).
84. Id. at 71 & n.4, 310 S.E.2d at 308 & n.4.
85. Id. at 70, 310 S.E. 2d at 307.
86. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 (discussion of the policy behind Agurs' rejection of rule 33). This
analysis supports the McDowell test.
87. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 309-10.
88. Id. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 310 (citing Agurs 427 U.S. at 107).
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ity. To require a finding by the judge that the undisclosed evidence was
likely to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of twelve jurors is con-
structively sound.89 But, in North Carolina, unlike the federal system,
the judge who considers post-conviction appeals is generally not the
judge who tried the original case.9" Thus, the suppressed evidence should
be weighed in the eyes of the original fact finder at trial as opposed to the
case-hardened eyes of the reviewing judge.91
C. Ramifications of McDowell's Pro-Defense Standard
McDowell effectively emasculated the Agurs pro-prosecution test of
materiality. McDowell expressly adopted a standard of materiality for
non-request cases which is equivalent to the traditional pro-defense stan-
dard for request cases.92 The pro-defense test of materiality strikes a new
balance among three significant factors.93 The first concerns the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. The second concerns the substantial burden of
disclosing evidence imposed on the prosecutor by the new pro-defense
test of materiality. The third concerns the administrative interest in the
finality of judgments. McDowell properly strikes the balance in favor of
the first factor at the expense of the other two.
1. Protecting Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
The right to a fair trial requires the prosecutor to disclose evidence to
the defendant that is probative of the defendant's guilt or innocence9 4
even though it is detrimental to the prosecutor's case.95 Yet, fairness
does not require the prosecutor to give the defense attorney full discovery
of his files. Materiality hinges on the strength or probative value of the
undisclosed evidence. 96 Thus, the defendant's right to a fair trial is rela-
tive to the definition of materiality.
The pro-defense test of materiality enhances the defendant's right to a
fair trial. A test of materiality relates to the probative value of the undis-
closed evidence. The probative value of the evidence in a pro-defense test
89. For a general discussion of this consistency in construction, see Babcock, supra note 4, at
1179.
90. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 309.
91. Id.
92. The traditional pro-defense test of materiality for cases involving the failure to disclose after
a specific request is "whether the evidence might affect the outcome of the trial." Agurs 427 U.S. at
104. McDowell adopted a standard which is expressly stated as equivalent to "whether the evidence
would likely have affected the outcome of the trial." McDowel, 310 N.C. at 71 & n.4, 310 S.E.2d at
308 & n.4. Thus, the McDowell test is a pro-defense test.
93. For a discussion of these three factors, see United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
1968).
94. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
95. See Comment, supra note 18, at 132.
96. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 69, 310 S.E.2d at 308. McDowell also noted that materiality hinged
upon the "magnitude of the evidence of guilt which the convicting jury heard." Id.
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1984], Art. 8
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss1/8
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
more closely resembles a relevance requirement97 as opposed to an excul-
patory requirement. A pro-defense test of materiality encourages the
prosecutor to disclose evidence, which has a lower probative value than
would be required under a pro-prosecution test. Consequently, with
more relevant evidence at his disposal, the defendant can prepare a
stronger case.
2. Burdens on the Prosecutor
A pro-defense test of materiality imposes substantial burdens on the
prosecutor. This results from the scope of the prosecutor's duty to dis-
close hinging upon the test of materiality applied by the reviewing court.
Thus, a pro-defense test of materiality creates burdens on the prosecutor
that would not necessarily exist with a pro-prosecution test.
The first burden involves the prosecutor's obligation to divulge more
information that is less crucial to the defendant's case.98 By definition, a
pro-defense test of materiality forces the prosecutor to disclose evidence
that would not neccessarily be considered material by a reviewing court
using a pro-prosecution standard.99 In so doing, a prosecutor is required
to scrutinize all evidence in his possession with an eye toward disclosing
any item which might be remotely favorable to the defense.) This obli-
gation more closely resembles the characteristics of the inquisitorial sys-
tem of justice rather than the adversarial system.101 Thus, the prosecutor
is compelled not only to seek convictions, but also to aid his adversary by
divulging any evidence of less than significant value to the defense.'0 2
Another burden concerns the use of a remand as a sanction for enforc-
ing the prosecutor's duty to disclose. 103 Prosecutors, who do not want
their hard earned convictions to be remanded, will be encouraged to
make good faith efforts to divulge. Yet the sanction is imposed if the
suppressed evidence is deemed material"° regardless of whether the
prosecutor acted in good faith. The sanction unjustifiably attaches to
intentional as well as unintentional acts of prosecutorial misconduct.
Consequently, the remand may appear arbitrary to the prosecutor.
97. Comment, supra note 18, at 132.
98. Id. at 133.
99. For a discussion of the distinction between a pro-defense standard and a pro-prosecution
standard, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. The prosecutor is not under a duty to relinquish his files sua sponte to the defense attorney.
In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 559, 387 P.2d 6, 14, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 298 (1963); State v. Goldberg,
261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334 (no common law right to discovery), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
101. For a general discussion of the effect of disclosure requirements on the adversarial system of
justice, see Babcock, supra note 4, at 1133.
102. Comment, supra note 18, at 134-35.
103. Id. at 133.
104. For a discussion of a transition in the courts' focus from prosecutorial misconduct to the
defendant's interest in a fair trial, see Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104 n.10.
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However, the use of in camera inspections by the court 0 5 mitigates the
prosecutor's burdens while preserving the defendant's fair trial guaran-
tees. In borderline cases, the prosecutor may delegate the decisions re-
garding the propriety of disclosure to the court, without opening up his
entire file to the defense attorney. Furthermore, the in camera inspection
determines the duty to disclose contemporaneously with the trial, instead
of retrospectively by a reviewing court in a post-conviction proceed-
ing.10 6 Therefore, the capriciousness of the remand, as a sanction, is
removed.
3. Finality of Judgments
On its face, a pro-defense test appears to unjustifiably ignore the ad-
ministrative interest in the finality of judgments. The likelihood that a
prosecutor will fail to volunteer some item of favorable evidence, coupled
with the retrospective application of a pro-defense test of materiality in a
post-conviction proceeding, would tend to increase remands.
10 7
However, the McDowell test is justifiable. Our system of jurisprudence
has never been adverse to recognizing that the individual's right to a fair
trial prevails over the interest in obtaining convictions. Furthermore, the
use of an in camera inspection 0 8 or other mechanism during trial"°9
would avoid the possibility of reversal in a post-conviction proceeding.
Thus, although the McDowell test of materiality has the potential for
administrative disadvantages, those disadvantages can be avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
In State v. McDowell, ° the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the pro-prosecution standard of materiality implicit in United States v.
Agurs,1 11 and proffered a pro-defense standard. The court held that the
proper test of materiality, in assessing the effect of the prosecutor's fail-
ure to volunteer exculpatory evidence to a defense attorney, is whether
the suppressed evidence is likely to create a reasonable doubt of guilt in
the jury's mind. 12
105. For a discussion of the use of in camera inspections, see supra note 44. There is no reason
why this or a similar mechanism cannot be used in non-request cases.
106. See supra note 44.
107. Cf United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968) (the likelihood of deliberate
prosecutorial misconduct in suppressing favorable evidence is remote. However, the unintentional
failure to volunteer evidence which is deemed favorable at a post-conviction proceeding is more
probable).
108. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
109. Another possible mechanism is a broadening of the scope of pretrial criminal discovery to
allow the opposing parties to examine questionable material evidence.
110. 310 N.C. 61, 310 S.E.2d 301 (1984).
111. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
112. McDowell, 310 N.C. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 309.
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The McDowell holding is appropriate for several reasons. First, the
McDowell test of materiality effectively eliminates the inherent inconsis-
tency in the Agurs test of materiality. 13 In Agurs, the Supreme Court
attempted, but failed, to articulate a test of materiality that was less se-
vere than the "likely to result in an acquittal" test." 4 The "likely to
create a reasonable doubt" test articulated in McDowell is less severe." 15
Second, the McDowell test properly restores the jury to its traditional
role as fact finder by assessing the materiality in the eyes of the jury that
convicted the defendant. Third, McDowell justly strikes a new balance
between the defendant's right to a fair trial, the burdens imposed on the
prosecutor, and the administrative interest in the finality ofjudgments.I 6
McDowell gives preferential treatment to the defendant's interest in hav-
ing all favorable exculpatory evidence disclosed at trial, at the expense of
the latter two factors.
BRETr A. KASSABIAN*
113. For a discussion of the Agurs inconsistency, see supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
114. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107.
115. For a discussion of the pro-defense McDowell test, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text.
116. For a discussion of the striking of a new balance among these factors, see supra notes 93-
109 and accompanying text.
* Wake Forest University School of Law.
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